Jamming-assisted Eavesdropping over Parallel Fading Channels by Han, Yitao et al.
1Jamming-assisted Eavesdropping over
Parallel Fading Channels
Yitao Han, Lingjie Duan, Senior Member, IEEE, and Rui Zhang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Unlike passive eavesdropping, proactive eavesdrop-
ping is recently proposed to use jamming to moderate a sus-
picious link’s communication rate for facilitating simultaneous
eavesdropping. This paper advances the proactive eavesdropping
research by considering a practical half-duplex mode for the
legitimate monitor (e.g., a government agency) and dealing with
the challenging case that the suspicious link opportunistically
communicates over parallel fading channels. To increase eaves-
dropping success probability, we propose cognitive jamming for
the monitor to change the suspicious link’s long-term belief on
the parallel channels’ distributions, and thereby induce it to
transmit more likely over a smaller subset of unjammed channels
with a lower transmission rate. As the half-duplex monitor
cannot eavesdrop the channel that it is simultaneously jamming
to, our jamming design should also control the probability of
such “own goal” that occurs when the suspicious link chooses
one of the jammed (uneavesdroppable) channels to transmit.
We formulate the optimal jamming design problem as a mixed
integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) and show that it is non-
convex. Nevertheless, we prove that the monitor should optimally
use the maximum jamming power if it decides to jam, for
maximally reducing suspicious link’s communication rate and
driving the suspicious link out of the jammed channels. Then
we manage to simplify the MINLP to integer programming and
reveal a fundamental trade-off in deciding the number of jammed
channels: jamming more channels helps reduce the suspicious
link’s communication rate for overhearing more clearly, but
increases own goal probability and thus decreases eavesdropping
success probability. Finally, we extend our study to the two-way
suspicious communication scenario, and show there is another in-
teresting trade-off in deciding the common jammed channels for
balancing bidirectional eavesdropping performances. Numerical
results show that our optimized jamming-assisted eavesdropping
schemes greatly increase eavesdropping success probability as
compared with the conventional passive eavesdropping.
Index Terms—Wireless surveillance, jamming-assisted eaves-
dropping, half-duplex monitor, parallel fading channels, eaves-
dropping success probability, bidirectional eavesdropping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security issues in wireless communication have drawn in-
creasingly more attentions from both academia and industry.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communication, its
physical layer is vulnerable to eavesdropping (interception of
confidential information) and jamming (interruption of legiti-
mate transmission) [1], and there are many works focusing on
defence schemes against eavesdropping and jamming, such as
secrecy beamforming [2]–[4], channel-based secret key [5],
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using cooperative networks to avoid eavesdropping [6] and
using hopping to avoid jamming attacks [7]. These works view
eavesdropping or jamming as malicious attacks and assume all
the communication links are rightful (see [8]–[13]). However,
they overlook the emerging case that wireless links or devices
can be established and used by criminals or terrorists to present
severe public security threats.
With the fast development of wireless technologies and
devices, user-controlled or infrastructure-free communications
(e.g., ad hoc network and short-range communication) now
become popular. For examples, mobile applications such as
MeshMe and FireChat can network users in the vicinity with
reliable mutual connection, and drones can take nice photos
or videos and send back to their users. While providing
great convenience to normal users, these new technologies
and devices can be misused to commit crimes. Terrorists
can use them to facilitate their plotting and acts, and spies
can use them to send out commercial or military secrets.
Since the data do not go through any public infrastructure
under internet service providers (ISPs), it is difficult to be
monitored by government surveillance program. As a result,
prior methods (e.g., deploying dedicated wiretapping devices
in network infrastructure) for eavesdropping infrastructure-
based communications (e.g., cellular networks) no longer
work. There is thus a growing need for authorized parties
to develop new approaches to legitimately eavesdrop these
infrastructure-free suspicious wireless communications. For
example, in the USA, the National Security Agency has
launched Terrorist Surveillance Program and aims to intercept
all wireless devices [14] to protect public security.
Traditionally, passive eavesdropping is used for such
surveillance purpose but it does not provide good eavesdrop-
ping performance once the suspicious transmitter (ST) is far
away from the monitor or hops to an undesirable channel.
Recently, a novel approach called proactive eavesdropping
via jamming is proposed in [15], [16], where the legitimate
monitor, ideally operating in full-duplex mode, uses jamming
to moderate the suspicious communication rate for facilitating
simultaneous eavesdropping. [17] extends this work by assum-
ing the legitimate monitor’s knowledge of full channel state
information (CSI) and designs adaptive jamming power in
each fading block. [18] studies the case that the suspicious link
adopts HARQ-based communication. [19] further considers
that the monitor is equipped with multiple antennas to achieve
more efficient jamming and better eavesdropping performance.
[20] proposes another efficient eavesdropping method, where
the monitor disguises as a fake relay to overhear the suspicious
communication. These works largely assume that there is only
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2Fig. 1. System model of jamming-assisted eavesdropping over the suspicious
link (suspicious transmitter to receiver).
one communication channel between the ST and suspicious
receiver (SR), and they require the monitor to operate in
interference-free full-duplex mode for enabling simultaneous
jamming and eavesdropping. However in practice, full-duplex
mode is difficult to implement, and self interference cancella-
tion is hard to achieve as perfect [21] [22]. Rather, half-duplex
mode is more widely used, and usually there is more than one
channel for the suspicious link to communicate over.
In this paper, we study a practical wireless surveillance
scenario: a half-duplex legitimate monitor eavesdrops from
a suspicious communication link over parallel independent
Rayleigh fading channels. As shown in Fig. 1, at the beginning
of each fading block, based on the conditions of the parallel
independently fading channels, the ST hops to the best one for
transmission in this fading block.1 Here we assume a typical
delay-sensitive application (e.g., video talk) on the suspicious
link, i.e., the transmitter adjusts its transmission rate by
maintaining a certain target outage probability at the receiver
[16]. Usually, the monitor is far away from the ST to stay
undetected, which makes the traditional passive eavesdropping
difficult or even infeasible. Under this challenging setup, the
monitor can deliberately send jamming signals to the SR to
induce the ST to transmit more likely over a smaller subset
of unjammed channels with a lower transmission rate, so that
the monitor can still eavesdrop effectively.
To avoid getting exposed, the monitor will not change
its jamming power and jammed channels over time, it just
disguises itself as a normal device-to-device (D2D) user in
sharing the network, by sending randomly modulated mes-
sages over fixed channels with fixed power. The ST/SR is
aware of its co-existence in the same network by updating
the long-term belief of the parallel channels’ distributions, but
does not consider it as a jammer. If the monitor keeps changing
its jammed channels or jamming power, then it is no longer
like a normal user and will cause the ST/SR’s suspicion to
hop over channels to increase resilience in a game theoretic
setting or directly stop transmitting any message as in [7] [23]
[24].
The key novelty and main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
1This approach of channel hopping and selection is commonly used in the
multi-channel scenario to enhance wireless security against eavesdropping and
jamming (e.g., [7]). In the future work, we will further consider the case that
the ST uses multiple channels to transmit, e.g., by deploying waterfilling-based
power allocation over multiple channels, which will bring more challenges to
legitimate eavesdropping.
• Novel jamming-assisted eavesdropping approach over
parallel fading channels: To our best knowledge, this is
the first paper studying wireless surveillance of parallel
fading channels via a half-duplex monitor. The monitor
uses jamming to change the suspicious link’s long-term
belief on the parallel channels’ distributions, and thereby
induce it to transmit more likely in a smaller subset of
unjammed channels with a lower transmission rate for
higher eavesdropping success probability. For practical
concern, we consider a challenging case that the monitor
has no instantaneous CSI of any suspicious link channels,
and the monitor in half-duplex mode cannot eavesdrop a
channel that it is simultaneously jamming to.
• Joint optimization of jamming power and number of
jammed channels: We formulate the problem for optimal
jamming design over parallel fading channels as a mixed
integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) and show it
is non-convex. Nevertheless, we prove that the monitor
should use the maximum jamming power if it decides to
jam. Then we manage to simplify the MINLP to integer
programming and further show that there is a fundamental
trade-off in deciding the number of jammed channels:
jamming more channels helps reduce the suspicious com-
munication rate for overhearing more clearly, but at the
risk that the ST is more likely to choose among the
jammed channels to transmit and as a result cannot be
overheard.
• Jamming-assisted eavesdropping over two-way commu-
nications: We extend the model to consider the two-way
communications of the suspicious link. As the monitor
cannot change its jamming strategy to avoid getting
exposed, it needs to jam the same subset of channels
for both communication directions. To decide the optimal
number of jammed channels, we show there is another
trade-off to balance the eavesdropping performances of
the two-way communications.
• Performance evaluation: Numerical results show that our
jamming-assisted eavesdropping schemes achieve great
performance gain over conventional passive eavesdrop-
ping. We also show that the monitor will perform passive
eavesdropping only when it is close to the ST, and will
jam increasingly more channels when it is moving away
from the ST to SR, due to deteriorating eavesdropping
channels and improving jamming channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model and formulate the legitimate
monitor’s proactive eavesdropping design problem. In Section
III, we solve the eavesdropping optimization problem in the
special two-channel case to gain useful insights. In Section
IV, we extend to multi-channel case and show an interesting
trade-off in deciding the number of jammed channels, for
eavesdropping success probability maximization. In Section
V, we further consider jamming-assisted eavesdropping over
two-way communications. In Section VI, we provide more nu-
merical results to evaluate our jamming-assisted eavesdropping
approach. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VII.
3TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND THEIR PHYSICAL MEANINGS
Symbols Physical meanings
N Total number of parallel channels.
n Number of jammed channels.
gai, gbi, gci
Channel power gain of the suspicious link with mean 1/λa, eavesdropping link with mean 1/λb,
jamming link with mean 1/λc, on channel i.
P ST’s transmitting power.
Qi Monitor’s jamming power on channel i.
Qmax Jamming power budget of the monitor.
σ2a, σ
2
b , σ
2
c Noise power level at the SR, the monitor, the ST.
RI , RII Suspicious transmission rate of passive eavesdropping, jamming-assisted eavesdropping.
δ Target outage probability at the SR.
ρ Own goal probability (probability that one of the jammed channels is chosen by the ST for transmission).
ϕI , ϕII Eavesdropping success probability of passive eavesdropping, jamming-assisted eavesdropping.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, the ST communicates with the SR
over N ≥ 2 parallel channels with independent Rayleigh
fading, and there is a legitimate monitor aiming to eavesdrop
their communications. We consider a quasi-stationary system
model, where the monitor has sufficient time (before the ST
and SR’s movement to another locations) to learn the global
channel distribution information (CDI) and launch jamming to
eavesdrop from the suspicious link’s transmission. The ST and
SR are both equipped with one antenna, while the legitimate
monitor is purposely equipped with two antennas, one for
receiving (eavesdropping) and the other for transmitting (jam-
ming). In order to characterize the fundamental performance
limit of this jamming-assisted eavesdropping approach, we
assume the encryption method used by the ST/SR is known
to the monitor beforehand (e.g. via eavesdropping the related
encryption codebook). Note that the focus of this work is on
decoding the message instead of decrypting the message itself.
The monitor disguises itself as a normal user in sharing the
same set of channels with the suspicious link, and operates
at half-duplex mode, which means it cannot eavesdrop the
channel that it is jamming to. Thus, the monitor will not jam
all N channels, otherwise, it overhears nothing. There are two
eavesdropping schemes to investigate and compare:
• Scheme I (passive eavesdropping): The legitimate moni-
tor performs passive eavesdropping over all N channels
while jamming no channels. This is also a benchmark
case for our proposed jamming-assisted eavesdropping to
compare with.
• Scheme II (jamming-assisted eavesdropping): The legit-
imate monitor performs jamming-assisted eavesdropping
by jamming n channels and eavesdropping from the rest
N − n channels, where 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1.
We consider a block fading model, where the channel stays
unchanged in each fading block and may vary over different
fading blocks. As shown in Fig. 1, we respectively denote the
channel power gains of the suspicious communication link,
eavesdropping link (from the ST to the monitor) and jamming
link (from the monitor to the SR) on channel i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
as gai, gbi and gci. By considering independent Rayleigh
fading, gai, gbi and gci are modelled as independent expo-
nentially distributed random variables with mean 1/λa, 1/λb
and 1/λc, respectively, with i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. This suggests
that all the suspicious link channels (gai, ∀i) are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), so are the eavesdropping
channels (gbi, ∀i) and the jamming channels (gci, ∀i). Hence
in Scheme II, in statistical sense it does not matter which
channels to jam given the jammed channel number by the
monitor (who does not know the instantaneous CSI of any
suspicions link channels). Thus, without loss of generality, we
assume the half-duplex monitor picks the first n out of N
channels to jam, and eavesdrops from the rest N−n channels.
We assume that the monitor only knows the global CDI (1/λa,
1/λb and 1/λc), which can be obtained by the monitor through
long-term observation as mentioned earlier.
On the other hand, we consider that the ST knows the
CSI of all the suspicious communication channels (i.e., gai’s
instantaneous values). The ST transmits at a fixed power P
and keeps hopping to the best channel for transmission in
each fading block. For ease of reading, Table I summarizes the
main symbol notations used in this paper and their physical
meanings.
A. Monitor’s expected performance of the suspicious link
without or with jamming
Both the signal sent by the ST and the jamming signal
sent by the monitor are assumed to be circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variables. This is because
that CSCG message will achieve channel capacity given CSCG
noise, and monitor’s CSCG jamming signal will achieve the
best jamming effect [8].
In Scheme I, the monitor does not jam, and the achievable
rate of suspicious communication on channel i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
is log2(1 +
gaiP
σ2a
) in bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz), where σ2a
denotes the noise power at the SR. The monitor expects the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) gaiPσ2a at the SR on the i
th channel
is a random variable, with cumulative distribution function
(CDF) given by
P
(
gaiP
σ2a
≤ γ
)
= 1− e−λaσ
2
a
P γ , γ ≥ 0. (1)
4In Scheme II, the monitor jams by allocating Qi ≥ 0 power
to channel i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, and thus the achievable rate of
suspicious communication channel i is log2(1 +
gaiP
gciQi+σ2a
).
The monitor expects the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the SR on the ith channel is a random variable, with
CDF given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1: In Scheme II, the CDF of SINR gaiPgciQi+σ2a at
the SR under jamming is given by
P
(
gaiP
gciQi + σ2a
≤ γ
)
= 1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P γ
λcP + λaQiγ
, γ ≥ 0. (2)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Based on (1) and (2) under the two eavesdropping schemes,
we are ready to formulate the monitor’s design objective.
In Scheme I, the legitimate monitor performs passive eaves-
dropping. The ST will choose the best channel, i.e., the one
with the highest SNR, in each fading block. From (1), the
monitor’s expected CDF of the maximum SNR γI at the SR
among all the channels is
P
(
γI = max
{
ga1P
σ2a
, · · · , gaNP
σ2a
}
≤ γ
)
=
(
1− e−λaσ
2
a
P γ
)N
, γ ≥ 0.
(3)
We consider a typical delay-sensitive transmission model for
the suspicious link, where the ST adjusts its transmission rate
to keep a target outage probability δ at the SR. Only when the
transmission rate RI is no larger than the achievable rate of
the best suspicious communication channel rIa = log2(1+γ
I),
the SR can successfully decode the delay-sensitive message.
Thus we have
P(rIa < RI) = δ, (4)
which yields the suspicious transmission rate RI as
RI = log2
(
1 +
P
λaσ2a
ln
1
1− δ 1N
)
. (5)
In Scheme II, the legitimate monitor performs jamming-
assisted eavesdropping and jams n ≥ 1 channels. Under jam-
ming, the ST will choose the channel with the highest SINR
among the n jammed channels or the channel with the highest
SNR among the remaining N−n channels without jamming in
each fading block. Note that ST’s chosen channel may still be
a jammed channel by the monitor due to independent channel
fading. From (1) and (2), the monitor’s expected CDF of the
maximum SINR or SNR γII at the SR among all the channels
is
P
(
γII = max
{
ga1P
gc1Q1 + σ2a
, · · · , ganP
gcnQn + σ2a
,
ga(n+1)P
σ2a
, · · · , gaNP
σ2a
}
≤ γ
)
=
(
1− e−λaσ
2
a
P γ
)N−n n∏
i=1
(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P γ
λcP + λaQiγ
)
, γ ≥ 0.
(6)
To maintain target outage probability δ at the SR, the ST
sets the transmission rate RII to ensure
P(log2(1 + γII) < RII) = δ, (7)
which yields(
1− e−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII−1)
)N−n n∏
i=1
(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII−1)
λcP+λaQi(2R
II−1)
)
=δ.
(8)
With its jamming power allocations {Qi}ni=1, the monitor
believes the ST will use rate RII to transmit. Note that there
is no closed-form solution RII to equation (8).
B. Monitor’s problem formulation for jamming-assisted
eavesdropping
The legitimate monitor aims to maximize the eavesdropping
success probability on the suspicious communication, which
is the percentage of fading blocks it can successfully decode.
In Scheme I, assuming the suspicious communication is
on the ith channel in a certain fading block, only when the
achievable rate of the ith eavesdropping channel is no smaller
than the suspicious transmission rate RI in (5), the monitor
can successfully eavesdrop in this fading block. Thus, the
eavesdropping success probability ϕI under Scheme I (passive
eavesdropping) is
ϕI =1−P
{
rb=log2
(
1+
gbiP
σ2b
)
<RI
}
=e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RI−1),
(9)
where σ2b denotes the noise power at the legitimate monitor.
In Scheme II, since all the suspicious communication chan-
nels have independent fading, it is possible that a jammed
channel is still chosen by the ST, and in this case the half-
duplex monitor cannot eavesdrop anything. We define the
probability that any jammed channel is chosen by the ST
(i.e., own goal probability of the monitor’s self-jamming) as
ρ ∈ [0, 1] and we will detail its analysis later in Sections III
and IV.
Now, assuming the suspicious communication is on the ith
channel in a certain fading block, only when none of the
jammed channels is chosen by the ST, and the achievable
rate of the ith eavesdropping channel is no smaller than
the suspicious transmission rate RII in (8), the monitor can
successfully eavesdrop. Thus, the eavesdropping success prob-
ability ϕII under Scheme II (jamming-assisted eavesdropping)
is
ϕII(n,Q1,· · ·,Qn)=(1−ρ(n,Q1,· · ·,Qn))
×
(
1−P
{
rb=log2
(
1+
gbiP
σ2b
)
<RII(n,Q1,· · ·,Qn)
})
= (1− ρ(n,Q1,· · ·,Qn))e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (n,Q1,···,Qn)−1).
(10)
From (9) and (10), we can formulate the optimization
problem for jamming design as a mixed integer nonlinear
5programming (MINLP), given by
(P1) : max
n,Q1,··· ,Qn
max{ϕI , ϕII(n,Q1, · · · , Qn)}
s.t. 0 <
n∑
i=1
Qi ≤ Qmax,
1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, n ∈ Z.
Note that ϕI does not depend on n or Qi and it is
a constant. In other words, the monitor only jams if the
optimized ϕII(n,Q1, · · · , Qn) is larger than ϕI .
The joint optimization of n and Qi’s in problem (P1)
is difficult due to discrete n and non-concave objective
ϕII(n,Q1, · · · , Qn). In the next section, we will first look
into the two-channel case (N = 2) to simplify this problem
and provide tractable analysis and clean insights. We will
generalize the results to the multi-channel case in Section IV.
III. OPTIMAL JAMMING-ASSISTED EAVESDROPPING OVER
TWO CHANNELS
If there are only two parallel channels (N = 2), in jamming-
assisted eavesdropping approach, the half-duplex legitimate
monitor will only jam one channel (i.e., n = 1), otherwise,
both channels are jammed and it cannot overhear anything
due to own goal. Its eavesdropping success probability ϕII
under our jamming-assisted eavesdropping in (10) now only
depends on jamming power Q, i.e.,
ϕII(Q) = (1− ρ(Q))e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (Q)−1), (11)
and (P1) is simplified to
(P2) : max
Q
max{ϕI , ϕII(Q)}
s.t. 0 < Q ≤ Qmax.
Proposition 3.1: In the two-channel case, the own goal
probability ρ(Q) in (11) due to self-jamming at the monitor
is given by
ρ(Q) = −λcσ
2
a
Q
e
2λcσ
2
a
Q Ei(−2λcσ
2
a
Q
), (12)
where Ei(·) is the exponential integral function [25, Eq. 8.21].
As jamming power Q increases, ρ(Q) decreases. This is
because a higher jamming power helps drive the suspicious
link to the other unjammed (eavesdropped) channel. More
specifically, we have limQ→0+ ρ(Q) = 1/2 due to trivial
jamming effect on changing the ST’s belief of channel distri-
butions, and the suspicious link is equally likely to choose both
i.i.d. channels to transmit. Moreover, limQ→∞ ρ(Q) = 0, since
the jammed channel will never be chosen by the suspicious
link under infinite jamming power.
Proof: See Appendix C, where we choose N = 2 and
n = 1. By substituting Q = 0+ and Q =∞ into (12), we can
derive the two limits for ρ(Q).
Proof:
Next, we analyze the non-outage probability at the monitor
e−λbσ
2
b (2
RII (Q)−1)/P , a part of (11), which is a function of
RII(Q). By simplifying (8) under N = 2 and n = 1, we have
the following results.
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Fig. 2. Eavesdropping success probability versus jamming power at the
monitor, where N = 2, λa = 1, λb = λc = 3, P = 10 dB, σ2a = σ
2
b = 1
and δ = 0.05.
Proposition 3.2: In the two-channel case, the suspicious
link’s transmission rate RII(Q) in (11) is the unique solution
to
(
1−e−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII (Q)−1)
)(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII (Q)−1)
λcP+λaQ(2R
II(Q)−1)
)
=δ.
(13)
As jamming power Q increases, RII(Q) decreases. This
is because the ST faces more noisy channel, and has to
transmit at a lower rate in order to maintain target outage
probability δ. More specifically, limQ→0+ RII(Q) = log2
(
1+
P ln(1−δ 12 )−1/λaσ2a
)
, which equals to RI in (5) with N = 2
under passive eavesdropping, due to trivial jamming effect on
the suspicious communication. Moreover, limQ→∞RII(Q) =
log2
(
1+P ln(1−δ)−1/λaσ2a
)
, which equals to RI in (5) with
N = 1 under the passive eavesdropping, since the jammed
channel will never be chosen.
Proof: By substituting N = 2 and n = 1 into (8),
we have (13). Denote the left-hand-side (LHS) of (13) to be
g(RII(Q), Q). According to the implicit function theorem, we
have
dRII(Q)
dQ
= − ∂g(R
II(Q), Q)/∂Q
∂g(RII(Q), Q)/∂RII(Q)
< 0,
thus RII(Q) monotonically decreases as Q increases. By
substituting Q = 0+ and Q = ∞ into (13), we can derive
the two limits for RII(Q).
Theorem 3.1: We denote Qth as the unique solution to(
1− ρ(Qth)
)
e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (Qth)−1) = e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RI−1). (14)
If Qmax > Qth, the legitimate monitor will jam with the
maximum power Qmax, otherwise it will perform passive
eavesdropping without jamming (as illustrated in Fig. 2).
According to Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, ϕII(Q) in (11)
monotonically increases with Q, thus the monitor will use the
maximum jamming power Qmax if it decides to jam, while
ϕI in (9) is a constant regardless of Q.
6When jamming power Q is close to zero,
lim
Q→0+
ϕII(Q) =
1
2
e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RI−1) < ϕI .
On the other hand, when jamming power goes to infinity,
limQ→∞RII(Q) = RI |(N=1) < RI , hence
lim
Q→∞
ϕII(Q) = e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RI |(N=1)−1) > ϕI .
Given that when jamming power goes to zero, the per-
formance of jamming-assisted eavesdropping is worse than
passive eavesdropping, while the performance of jamming-
assisted eavesdropping increases with jamming power, and
eventually when jamming power goes to infinity, becomes
better than passive eavesdropping, it follows that there exists
a unique intersection point between ϕI and ϕII(Q) at point
Q = Qth, which is given in (14). If Qmax > Qth, the monitor
will jam with the maximum jamming power Qmax, otherwise
it will perform passive eavesdropping to obtain a greater ϕI
than ϕII(Qmax).
As we can see from above, in jamming-assisted eaves-
dropping, jamming with a higher power helps reduce own
goal probability ρ(Q) and transmission rate RII(Q) at the
same time. Thus, by using up jamming power budget Qmax,
the monitor can achieve the maximum eavesdropping success
probability.
IV. OPTIMAL JAMMING-ASSISTED EAVESDROPPING OVER
MULTIPLE CHANNELS
In this section, we consider the general case with multiple
i.i.d. fading channels for the optimal jamming design, and need
to further decide how many channels to jam. Similar to the
N = 2 case in Theorem 3.1, we also expect to jam with the
maximum power Qmax in the general case of N ≥ 2 channels
if the monitor decides to jam. More specifically, we have the
following result.
Proposition 4.1: Given that n ≥ 1 of N channels are
jammed, the monitor should allocate all the jamming power
over n jammed channels equally, i.e., Q∗i = Qmax/n, ∀i ∈
{1, · · · , n}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Thanks to Proposition 4.1, we know that the monitor will
evenly allocate all the jamming power over the jammed
channels, as a result the eavesdropping success probability ϕII
under jamming-assisted eavesdropping in (10) only depends on
the number of jammed channels n, i.e.,
ϕII(n) = (1− ρ(n))e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (n)−1). (15)
Thus, we manage to simplify the non-convex MINLP in
(P1) to the following single-variable problem:
(P3) : max
n
max{ϕI , ϕII(n)}
s.t. 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, n ∈ Z.
As n is an integer, problem (P3) is an integer programming
problem and still difficult to solve analytically. Next, we will
analyze the monotonic properties of own goal probability ρ(n)
and suspicious link’s transmission rate RII(n) with respect to
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Fig. 3. ϕII(n), 1− ρ(n) and non-outage probability at the monitor versus
number of jammed channels n, where N = 8, λa = λb = 1, λc = 3,
P = 10 dB, Qmax = 20 dB, σ2a = σ
2
b = 1 and δ = 0.05.
n in the objective, to understand the key insights and solve
(P3).
Proposition 4.2: In the general multi-channel case, the own
goal probability ρ(n) at the monitor in (15) is given by
ρ(n)=
(N−n)λaσ2a
P
N−n−1∑
i=0
n∑
j=1
(
N−n−1
i
)(
n
j
)
(−1)i+j+1
×
(
λaQmax
nλcP
)−j(
(1+i+j)
λaσ
2
a
P
)j−1
e
(1+i+j)nλcσ
2
a
Qmax
×Γ
(
1−j, (1+i+j)nλcσ
2
a
Qmax
)
,
(16)
where Γ(·, ·) is the upper incomplete gamma function [25, Eq.
8.35]. Further, ρ(n) increases as n increases.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Here, ρ(n) increases with n due to two reasons. First, more
channels are jammed and potentially they can be selected by
the suspicious link for transmission. Second, the jamming
power on each jammed channel weakens as n increases
given the total jamming power budget, and thus each jammed
channel is more likely to be chosen by the suspicious link.
Thus, the suspicious link is more likely to transmit on the
jammed channels and this increases the self-jamming (own
goal) probability ρ(n) for the monitor.
Next, we determine the non-outage probability
e−λbσ
2
b (2
RII (n)−1)/P at the monitor in (15), which is a
function of RII(n). Similar to ρ(n), here RII(n) only
depends on n.
Proposition 4.3: In the general multi-channel case, the
suspicious link’s transmission rate RII(n) in (15) is the unique
solution to(
1−e−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII−1)
)N−n(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RII−1)
λcP+λa
Qmax
n (2
RII−1)
)n
=δ.
(17)
Further, RII(n) monotonically decreases as n increases.
Proof: See Appendix D.
7Fig. 4. Jamming-assisted eavesdropping over two-way communications (user A and user B alternately communicate with each other over different time slots).
The reason why RII(n) decreases with n is because
jamming more channels increases the chance that the ST
chooses the jammed channels, and the ST will transmit at
a lower rate to maintain target outage probability at the SR. A
lower transmission rate RII(n) leads to a higher non-outage
probability e−λbσ
2
b (2
RII (n)−1)/P at the monitor, and thus the
monitor can overhear more clearly.
Fig. 3 numerically illustrates 1 − ρ(n) in (16), non-outage
probability in (17), and their product ϕII(n) in (15). As
n increases, it is observed that 1 − ρ(n) decreases and
e−λbσ
2
b (2
RII (n)−1)/P increases. To maximize ϕII(n), there is
thus a trade-off in deciding the optimal number of jammed
channels n∗ (here n∗ = 5 in this numerical example).
It should be noted that it is still difficult to analytically solve
n∗ in (P3) even by relaxing n to be continuous for tractable
analysis. This is because not only RII(n) in (17) is not in
closed-form, but also it is difficult to approximate ρ(n) in (16)
to be a continuous function due to the combinatorial nature and
the involved upper incomplete gamma function. Still, we can
numerically obtain n∗, by a one-dimensional exhaustive search
in the set {1, 2, · · · , N−1} with low computation complexity
of O(N).
Proposition 4.4: In jamming-assisted eavesdropping
scheme, as the monitor’s jamming power budget Qmax goes
to zero, it is optimal for the monitor to jam as few channels as
possible (n∗ = 1), and the eavesdropping success probability
is
lim
Qmax→0+
ϕII(n∗ = 1) =
(
1− 1
N
)
e
λbσ
2
b
λaσ2a
ln
(
1−δ 1N
)
. (18)
On the other hand, as the monitor’s jamming power bud-
get Qmax goes to infinity, it is optimal for the monitor to
maximally jam n∗ = N − 1 channels and eavesdrop the
remaining one with ideal zero own goal probability, and the
eavesdropping success probability is
lim
Qmax→∞
ϕII(n∗ = N − 1) = e
λbσ
2
b
λaσ2a
ln(1−δ)
. (19)
Proof: When the monitor’s jamming power budget goes
to zero, the jammed channels and unjammed channels are
the same in distribution, while the half-duplex monitor cannot
eavesdrop the jammed channels, making the own goal proba-
bility proportional to n, i.e.,
lim
Qmax→0+
ρ(n) =
n
N
.
Meanwhile, the transmission rate RII(n) in (17) now becomes
the same as constant transmission rate of passive eavesdrop-
ping in (5). Thus, the eavesdropping success probability in
(15) becomes
lim
Qmax→0+
ϕII(n) =
(
1− n
N
)
e
λbσ
2
b
λaσ2a
ln
(
1−δ 1N
)
. (20)
As we can see from (20), limQmax→0+ ϕ
II(n) monotonically
decreases as n increases, thus it is optimal to only jam n∗ = 1
channel when employing the jamming-assisted eavesdropping.
On the other hand, as jamming power budget goes to infin-
ity, the own goal probability becomes limQmax→∞ ρ(n) = 0,
as the severely jammed channel will never be chosen by the
ST. Meanwhile, the transmission rate RII(n) becomes
lim
Qmax→∞
RII(n) = log2
(
1 +
P
λaσ2a
ln
1
1− δ 1N−n
)
.
Thus, the eavesdropping success probability becomes
lim
Qmax→∞
ϕII(n) = e
λbσ
2
b
λaσ2a
ln
(
1−δ
1
N−n
)
. (21)
As we can see from (21), limQmax→∞ ϕ
II(n) monotonically
increases as n increases, thus it is optimal to jam n∗ = N −1
channels in this case.
Note that under optimal n∗, if ϕII(n∗) > ϕI , the legiti-
mate monitor will perform jamming-assisted eavesdropping,
otherwise it will perform passive eavesdropping.
V. EXTENSION TO EAVESDROPPING TWO-WAY
COMMUNICATIONS
So far, we have considered the one-way communication
from the ST to the SR for the suspicious link, while in practice,
the two users may need to alternately exchange information
with each other over time periods or fading blocks (see Fig. 4).
Our jamming-assisted eavesdropping approach in Section IV
is designed for the one-way communication, and will be
extended in this section for the two-way communications.
The distributions of channel power gains of the communi-
cation from user A to user B follow the same model defined in
8Section II, i.e., gai ∼ exp(λa), gbi ∼ exp(λb), gci ∼ exp(λc).
Due to the reciprocity of wireless channel, the suspicious
communication channels are the same from user B to user A,
i.e., g′ai ∼ exp(λa). However, the original jamming channels
now become eavesdropping channels, i.e., g′bi ∼ exp(λc), and
the original eavesdropping channels now become jamming
channels, i.e., g′ci ∼ exp(λb). As we can see, the optimal
number of jammed channels are in general different for user
A to B communication (n∗AB as computed in last section) and
user B to A communication (n∗BA), where subscript (·)AB
denotes the communication direction from user A to user B,
and (·)BA denotes the communication from user B to user A.
But alternately jamming n∗AB 6= n∗BA channels over time will
easily arouse the suspicion of suspicious users by examining
the channel statistics. Then the suspicious link can tell that
the monitor is a jammer instead of a normal D2D user with
time-division-duplex.
To intercept the two-way communications between user A
and user B, we need to balance these two communication ways
for maximizing the minimum eavesdropping success probabil-
ity between both communication ways, keep the same jammed
channels and jamming power in the long run. Without loss of
generality, if n out of N i.i.d. fading channels are jammed in
two-way communications, we consider the monitor picks the
first n out of N channels to jam. Similar to Proposition 4.1 in
the one-way communication, the monitor should also use up
all the jamming power budget and evenly partition over the
jammed channels in two-way communications. Thus, the max-
min optimization problem can be reformulated as follows.2
(P4) : max
n
max{min{ϕIAB , ϕIBA},min{ϕIIAB(n), ϕIIBA(n)}}
s.t. 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, n ∈ Z.
(P4) compares the performance of jamming-assisted eaves-
dropping min{ϕIIAB(n), ϕIIBA(n)} and the performance of pas-
sive eavesdropping min{ϕIAB , ϕIBA} in two-way communi-
cations. Since both ϕIAB and ϕ
I
BA are constants, we can
only focus on optimizing the performance of jamming-assisted
eavesdropping min{ϕIIAB(n), ϕIIBA(n)}. To numerically solve
this integer programming, we can obtain the optimal num-
ber of jammed channels n∗ in two-way communications,
by efficiently performing one-dimensional exhaustive search
in the set {1, 2, · · · , N − 1} with low computation com-
plexity of O(N). Then we compare min{ϕIAB , ϕIBA} with
min{ϕIIAB(n∗), ϕIIBA(n∗)}: if the former is smaller, the mon-
itor will perform jamming-assisted eavesdropping with n∗
jammed channels, otherwise the monitor will perform passive
eavesdropping.
We first use a numerical example to illustrate the eavesdrop-
ping success probability of jamming-assisted eavesdropping
in two-way communications. Assuming there are N = 8
parallel channels, we set the mean channel power gains to
be 1/λa = 1/5, 1/λb = 1 and 1/λc = 1/4, additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) power as σ2a = σ
2
b = σ
2
c = 1, target
2Our problem (P4) can further include different weights for the two
communication ways. For example, if the monitor values the message from
user A (e.g., a leader of a criminal gang) to user B (e.g., a follower) more
important, it will assign a large weight to this way’s eavesdropping success
probability.
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Fig. 5. Eavesdropping success probability in jamming-assisted eavesdropping
of two-way communications, which is the minimum of the eavesdropping
success probabilities from user A to B and from user B to A.
outage probability at user A/B as δ = 0.05, transmitting power
of user A/B as P = 10 dB and jamming power budget as
Qmax = 20 dB.
As Fig. 5 shows, the optimal number of jammed channels
n∗AB for suspicious user A’s communication to user B is
2, while the optimal number of jammed channels n∗BA for
suspicious user B’s communication to user A is 6; and we find
the optimal number of jammed channels n∗ = 5 to balance
between the communications from user A to B and from user
B to A.
It is difficult to analytically derive the optimal solution to
(P4), due to the non-concave objective involving incomplete
gamma function and the discrete nature of decision variable
n. Despite of these, we still manage to derive some analytical
results by assuming the one-way eavesdropping success prob-
ability ϕII(n) (i.e., ϕIIAB(n) for user A to B and ϕ
II
BA(n) for
user B to A) is unimodal (having only one peak) or monotonic
in n as in Fig. 3. Actually, this is always the case in our
extensive simulations though it is difficult to rigorously prove.
Proposition 5.1: Assuming the objective functions ϕIIAB(n)
and ϕIIBA(n) in (P4) are unimodal or monotonic in n, the
optimal jamming-assisted eavesdropping scheme is given as
follows, depending on the jamming power budget Qmax.
• If the monitor’s jamming power budget Qmax is low
(i.e., Qmax < Q), jamming more channels hurts the
eavesdropping performances on both ways, where Q =
min{Qmax|ϕIIAB(1) ≥ ϕIIAB(2), ϕIIBA(1) ≥ ϕIIBA(2)}. In
this case, it is optimal for the monitor to minimally jam
n∗ = 1 channel. As a special case, when Qmax goes to
zero, n∗ = 1 (as a two-way extension of Proposition 4.4).
• If the monitor’s jamming power budget Qmax is high
(i.e., Qmax > Q¯), jamming more channels improves the
eavesdropping performances on both ways, where Q¯ =
max{Qmax|ϕIIAB(N−2) ≤ ϕIIAB(N−1), ϕIIBA(N−2) ≤
ϕIIBA(N−1)}. In this case, it is optimal for the monitor to
maximally jam n∗ = N − 1 channels. As a special case,
when Qmax goes to infinity, n∗ = N − 1 (as a two-way
extension of Proposition 4.4).
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Fig. 6. Eavesdropping success probability ϕII versus number of jammed
channels n under different power budget Qmax’s.
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Fig. 7. Eavesdropping success probability versus mean channel power
gain of the eavesdropping and jamming links with different total numbers
of channels N ’s.
• If the jamming power budget Qmax is medium (i.e.,
Q ≤ Qmax ≤ Q¯), the optimal number of jammed
channels n∗ is between n∗AB and n
∗
BA, by balancing the
eavesdropping performances of the two ways.
Proof: See Appendix E.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide more numerical results to val-
idate our studies and designs. Assuming there are N = 8
parallel channels, we set the mean channel power gain of
the suspicious communication link, eavesdropping link and
jamming link in the one-way communication to be 1/λa =
1, 1/λb = 1 and 1/λc = 1/3, respectively. We also set
the AWGN power as σ2a = σ
2
b = σ
2
c = 1, the target outage
probability at the SR as δ = 0.05 and transmitting power of
the ST as P = 10 dB.
Fig. 6 shows the eavesdropping success probability ϕII
as a function of n and Qmax for the case of one-way
communication from suspicious user A to user B. When Qmax
is small (e.g., Qmax = 4 dB curve in Fig. 6), the monitor
will perform passive eavesdropping. When Qmax is sufficiently
large (starting from Qmax = 10 dB), the monitor will jam
to assist eavesdropping for a larger eavesdropping success
probability. We can see that as Qmax increases, the monitor
will jam more channels by optimally controlling the trade-off
between own goal probability and transmission rate. When
Qmax is further large (e.g., Qmax = 40 dB), the monitor will
optimally jam N − 1 channels to overhear the lowest-rate
suspicious communication in the remaining single channel,
without worrying about the own goal of self-jamming. This
result is consistent with Proposition 4.4.
Then we consider the passive eavesdropping as a benchmark
for performance comparison. We set the mean channel power
gain of the suspicious communication link to be 1/λa = 1
and jamming power budget to be Qmax = 30 dB. Here we
consider the monitor is far away from the ST and SR, thus
the mean channel power gains of eavesdropping channels and
jamming channels are nearly the same, i.e., 1/λb = 1/λc.
Fig. 7 shows the eavesdropping success probability as a
function of N and mean channel power gain of eavesdropping
and jamming links. As their mean channel power gains in-
crease, eavesdropping success probabilities of both jamming-
assisted and passive eavesdropping increase. But jamming-
assisted eavesdropping greatly outperforms passive eavesdrop-
ping. The performance of jamming-assisted eavesdropping
is better when total number of channels is smaller (e.g.,
N = 2 in Fig. 7), as the monitor can more efficiently induce
the suspicious link to use a smaller subset of unjammed
channels and a lower transmission rate under the same jam-
ming power budget. While the performance gain of jamming-
assisted eavesdropping comparing with passive eavesdropping
is greater when total number of channels is large (e.g., N = 8
in Fig. 7), as more channels provides more degrees of freedom
for jamming.
Next, we study the effect of the monitor’s location. To cap-
ture the effect of large-scale fading, we consider that for any
two points with coordinates (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in the two-
dimensional (2D) ground plane, the mean channel power gain
between the two points is inversely proportional to the square
of their distance, i.e., 1/λ = 1/
(
(x1−x2)2+(y1−y2)2
)
. The
ST is located at (3, 4.5), and the SR is located at (7, 4.5). The
distances are normalized with transmit power. The legitimate
monitor is placed in different locations in this plane, and its
jamming power budget is Qmax = 30 dB.
Fig. 8(a) shows the optimal number of jammed channels n∗
in different monitor’s locations in the 2D ground plane. When
the monitor is close to the ST, passive eavesdropping can
already provide good eavesdropping performance. When the
monitor is moving away from the ST, passive eavesdropping
can no longer provide good eavesdropping performance, and
the monitor will jam more channels to lower the suspicious
link’s transmission rate in order to overhear more clearly.
When the monitor is close to the SR, which means now
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(a) Optimal number of jammed channels n∗ ver-
sus different monitor’s locations in the 2D ground
plane (N = 8 channels in total).
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(b) Eavesdropping success probability of
jamming-assisted eavesdropping versus different
monitor’s locations in the 2D ground plane.
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(c) Eavesdropping success probability of passive
eavesdropping versus different monitor’s locations
in the 2D ground plane.
Fig. 8. Effect of monitor’s geometric locations on jamming strategy design, jamming-assisted eavesdropping performance, and passive eavesdropping
performance.
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Fig. 9. Eavesdropping success probability versus monitor’s location in two-way communications.
the efficiency of jamming is high, the monitor will jam
most channels (up to N − 1) for improving eavesdropping
performance.
Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c) compare the eavesdropping success
probability of jamming-assisted eavesdropping and passive
eavesdropping with different monitor’s locations in the 2D
ground plane. As we can see, the eavesdropping success
probability of passive eavesdropping is fully determined by the
distance between the monitor and the ST, and a good eaves-
dropping performance can only be guaranteed when the mon-
itor is close to the ST. While our proposed jamming-assisted
eavesdropping greatly outperforms passive eavesdropping even
when the monitor is not close to the ST, because it can
efficiently jam the SR and drive the ST to transmit in a smaller
subset of channels with a lower transmission rate so that
the monitor can eavesdrop more effectively. The performance
gain of jamming-assisted eavesdropping is significant when the
monitor is close to the SR, since now the efficiency of jamming
is high. This clearly shows that passive eavesdropping is
dramatically sensitive to the ST-monitor distance, while our
proposed jamming-assisted eavesdropping is no longer that
sensitive even when the monitor is geometrically far away
from the ST.
Finally, we examine the performance of jamming-assisted
eavesdropping in two-way communications. Here we still
assume the mean channel power gain between any two points
is inversely proportional to the square of their distance, similar
to the previous simulation. Suspicious user A is located at
(1, 1) and suspicious user B at (3, 1). The legitimate monitor
can be at any point between (0, 0) and (4, 0) to eavesdrop the
two-way communications, and its jamming power budget is
set to Qmax = 30 dB. We provide two benchmark cases for
performance comparison with our optimal solution. Bench-
mark n∗AB tells that the monitor just focuses on the one-way
communication from A to B, and jams n∗AB channels accord-
ing to the one-way surveillance problem in (P3). Meanwhile,
benchmark n∗BA focuses on the one-way communication from
B to A, and jams n∗BA channels.
Fig. 9(a) compares the optimal number of jammed channels
n∗ in (P4) with n∗AB and n
∗
BA when the monitor moves
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horizontally between (0, 0) and (4, 0). Fig. 9(b) shows the
eavesdropping success probability versus the monitor’s lo-
cation in two-way communications. We have the following
observations.
• When the monitor is between (0, 0) and (0.3, 0), it is
far away from user B and the overall eavesdropping
performance is bottlenecked by user B as the ST, thus
jamming n∗BA channels will give the best eavesdropping
performance as the optimal n∗. Note that n∗AB is smaller
than n∗BA (n
∗) in this case, since user A is much closer to
the monitor than user B, which is consistent with Fig. 8(a)
in the sense that the monitor will jam more channels when
it is moving away from the ST.
• When the monitor is moving from (0.3, 0) to (1.6, 0),
it is getting closer to user A than user B, thus the
eavesdropping performance of benchmark n∗AB improves
more significantly than that of benchmark n∗BA. Still, n
∗
outperforms benchmarks n∗AB and n
∗
BA. Note that n
∗
BA
is greater than n∗ in this case, because now the monitor
is very close to user A, and according to Fig. 8(a), the
monitor will jam most channels when it is close to the
SR.
• When the monitor is between (1.6, 0) and (2, 0), the
monitor’s distances to users A and B are close, thus both
benchmarks n∗AB and n
∗
BA are symmetric and achieve the
optimal eavesdropping performance as n∗. Note that in
Fig. 9(b) the sharp performance increase of benchmarks
n∗AB and n
∗
BA at point (1.6, 0) is caused by changing
the number of jammed channels. Taking n∗AB as an
example, the monitor is moving closer to user B (SR
in n∗AB’s point of view), and at the point (1.6, 0), the
monitor increases the number of jammed channels due
to better jamming efficiency, which causes the obvious
eavesdropping performance change.
Finally, the eavesdropping success probability reaches the
maximum when the monitor is at (2, 0), since now the
monitor’s distances to user A and user B are the same. The
eavesdropping performance analysis of the monitor moving
from (2, 0) to (4, 0) is similar as above by symmetry.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a new wireless security model, which is
jamming-assisted legitimate eavesdropping over parallel inde-
pendently fading channels. The legitimate monitor uses jam-
ming in order to achieve better eavesdropping performance.
Assuming Rayleigh fading, we formulate the optimization
problem for jamming design as a mixed integer nonlinear
programming (MINLP). Despite its non-convexity, we show
that the legitimate monitor should use the maximum jamming
power for the best eavesdropping performance if it decides to
jam. Then we simplify the MINLP to integer programming
and further show that there is a trade-off in deciding the
number of jammed channels in the general multi-channel case,
where jamming more channels helps reduce the suspicious
communication rate for overhearing more clearly, but at the
risk that the ST is more likely to choose jammed channels to
transmit and as a result cannot be overheard. Finally, we extend
our study to two-way communications, and show another
trade-off in deciding the common jammed channels for balanc-
ing the bidirectional eavesdropping performances. Numerical
results show that our jamming-assisted eavesdropping schemes
greatly improve eavesdropping success probability comparing
with conventional passive eavesdropping.
This work can be extended in various directions. For exam-
ple, the suspicious link can transmit at multiple channels and
perform combining at the receiver, or there can be multiple
suspicious link pairs, which will bring more challenges to
legitimate eavesdropping. The more general case of parallel
channels with correlated (non-independent) fading is also
worth investigating in future work.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2.1
We aim to show the distribution of SINR Y = gaiPgciQi+σ2a on
jammed channel i. Denote its numerator and denominator as
Y1 = gaiP and Y2 = gciQi + σ2a, respectively. As gai and gci
follow independent exponential distributions with mean 1/λa
and 1/λc, respectively, we have
fY1(y1) =
λa
P
e−
λa
P y1 , y1 ≥ 0,
fY2(y2) =
λc
Qi
e
− λcQi (y2−σ
2
a), y2 ≥ σ2a.
The probability density function (PDF) of Y = Y1/Y2 can
be calculated as follows
fY (y) =
λaλc
PQi
e
λcσ
2
a
Qi
∫ ∞
σ2a
y2e
−( λcQi+
λay
P )y2 dy2.
With the help of [25, Eq. 3.351.2], we have
fY (y) =
λaλc(λcPσ
2
a + PQi + λaQiσ
2
ay)
(λcP + λaQiy)2
e−
λaσ
2
ay
P , y ≥ 0,
and the CDF of Y can be calculated as∫ y
0
fY (y) dy = 1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P y
λcP + λaQiy
, y ≥ 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
For certain jamming scheme S1, the own goal probability
can be expressed as
ρS1(n) =P
(
max
{ ga1P
gc1Q1 + σ2a
, · · · , gajP
gcjQj + σ2a
, · · · ,
ganP
gcnQn + σ2a
}
> max
{ga1P
σ2a
, · · · , ga(N−n)P
σ2a
})
.
There exists a jamming scheme S2, where the monitor
reduces jamming power Qj on channel j to Qj − ∆ with
∆ > 0, for which
ρS2(n) = P
(
max
{ ga1P
gc1Q1+σ2a
, · · · , gajP
gcj(Qj−∆)+σ2a
, · · · ,
ganP
gcnQn+σ2a
}
> max
{ga1P
σ2a
, · · · , ga(N−n)P
σ2a
})
.
Clearly, ρS2(n) is larger than ρS1(n).
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For certain jamming scheme S1, the transmission rate of the
ST satisfies(
1−e−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RIIS1−1)
)N−n n∏
i=1
(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RIIS1−1)
λcP+λaQi(2
RIIS1−1)
)
=δ.
There exists a jamming scheme S2, where the monitor
reduces jamming power Qj on channel j to Qj−∆, for which(
1−e−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RIIS2−1)
)N−n(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RIIS2−1)
λcP+λa(Qj−∆)(2R
II
S2−1)
)
×
n∏
i=1,i6=j
(
1− λcPe
−λaσ
2
a
P (2
RIIS2−1)
λcP + λaQi(2R
II
S2
− 1)
)
= δ.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2, RIIS2 is larger than
RIIS1 , while maintaining the same target outage probability δ
at the receiver, but the non-outage probability at the monitor
will decrease due to the higher transmission rate RIIS2 .
From above, if the jamming power on any jammed channel
decreases, the product of non-outage probability and non-own-
goal probability at the monitor, i.e. the eavesdropping success
probability, will degenerate. So the monitor will always use
up all the jamming power.
Further since all channels are i.i.d. fading, by symmetry it
is optimal to allocate the same amount of jamming power over
n jammed channels. Thus, if n of N channels are jammed, the
monitor should evenly allocate all the jamming power over n
jammed channels, i.e., Qmax/n.
C. Proofs of Propositions 3.1 and 4.2
We first prove that the own goal probability ρ(n) increases
as the number of jammed channels n increases.
Assuming k out of N channels are jammed, the own goal
probability can be expressed as
ρ(k) = P
(
max
{ ga1P
gc1
Qmax
k + σ
2
a
, · · · , gakP
gck
Qmax
k + σ
2
a
}
>
max
{ga1P
σ2a
, · · · , ga(N−k)P
σ2a
})
.
If now k + 1 channels are jammed, then the own goal
probability becomes
ρ(k+1)=P
(
max
{ ga1P
gc1
Qmax
k+1 +σ
2
a
, · · · , ga(k+1)P
gc(k+1)
Qmax
k+1 +σ
2
a
}
>
max
{ga1P
σ2a
, · · · , ga(N−k−1)P
σ2a
})
.
Since the number of jammed channels changes from k to
k + 1, the jamming power on each jammed channel gets
smaller, which makes them easier to be chosen by the ST for
transmission. Also, there are more jammed channels (from k to
k+1) and less unjammed channels (from N−k to N−k−1).
Combining these two effects, clearly as the number of jammed
channels n increases, the own goal probability ρ(n) will also
increase.
Note that Proposition 3.1 is a special case of Proposition
4.2 and it is sufficient to prove Proposition 4.2 here. Denote
Xi =
gaiP
σ2a
and Yi = gaiPgciQi+σ2a , the CDFs of Xi and Yi are
given in (1) and (2), respectively. Then we have
ρ(n)=
∫ ∞
0
P{max{Y(1), · · · , Y(n) ≥ x}}
× fmax{X(1),··· ,X(N−n)}(x) dx,
where fmax{X(1),··· ,X(N−n)}(x) is the PDF of the maximum
SNR of the N − n unjammed channels. Thus we have
ρ(n) =
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
x
d[FY (y)]
n
)
d[FX(x)]
N−n
=
(N − n)λaσ2a
P
∫ ∞
0
(
1− (1− e
−λaσ
2
a
P x
1 + λaQmaxnλcP x
)n
)
×e−λaσ
2
a
P x(1− e−λaσ
2
a
P x)N−n−1dx
(a)
=
(N − n)λaσ2a
P
N−n−1∑
i=0
n∑
j=1
(
N − n− 1
i
)(
n
j
)
(−1)i+j+1
×
∫ ∞
0
1
(1 + λaQmaxnλcP x)
j
e−(i+j+1)
λaσ
2
a
P xdx
(b)
=
(N − n)λaσ2a
P
N−n−1∑
i=0
n∑
j=1
(
N − n− 1
i
)(
n
j
)
(−1)i+j+1
×
(
λaQmax
nλcP
)−j(
(1 + i+ j)
λaσ
2
a
P
)j−1
e
(1+i+j)nλcσ
2
a
Qmax
×Γ
(
1− j, (1 + i+ j)nλcσ
2
a
Qmax
)
,
where equality (a)= comes from the fact that the total number
of channels N and the number of jammed channels n are
both integers, following the binomial expansion of the two
polynomial terms; and equality (b)= comes from reference [25,
Eq. 3.353.2], and Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete Gamma function.
Note that Γ(0, x) = −Ei(−x), which completes the proof of
Proposition 3.1 with N = 2 and n = 1.
D. Proof of Proposition 4.3
Denote u = 2R
II−1. We define the LHS of (17) as h(n, u),
which is the outage probability at the SR. Then we have
h(n, u)− δ = 0.
By taking the first-order derivative of this implicit function
over u and n, we have the relationship between u and n as
follows
du
dn
= −∂h(n, u)/∂n
∂h(n, u)/∂u
.
We then can explicitly derive
∂h(n, u)
∂n
=
( −λaQmaxλcP une−λaσ2aP u
(1 + λaQmaxλcP
u
n )
2(1− e−
λaσ2a
P
u
1+λaQmaxλcP
u
n
)
+ ln
(
1 +
λaQmax
λcP
u
n
1+λaQmaxλcP
u
n
e−
λaσ
2
a
P u
1− e−λaσ
2
a
P u
))
,
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and according to inequality ln(1 + x) > x1+x for any x > 0,
we have
∂h(n, u)
∂n
>
λaQmax
λcP
u
ne
−λaσ
2
a
P u
(1+ λaQmaxλcP
u
n)(1− e
−λaσ
2
a
P
u
1+λaQmaxλcP
u
n
)
(
1− 1
1+λaQmaxλcP
u
n
)
> 0.
(22)
For ∂h(n,u)∂u , as the transmission rate R
II increases, outage
probability at the SR h(n, u) increases, thus
∂h(n, u)
∂u
> 0. (23)
Combining (22) and (23), we have
du
dn
= −∂h(n, u)/∂n
∂h(n, u)/∂u
< 0.
By substituting RII = log2(1 + u) back, we have
dRII
dn
=
du
dn
dRII
du
< 0.
Thus, as the number of jammed channels n increases, the
transmission rate RII(n) decreases.
E. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Consider the expression of eavesdropping success proba-
bility ϕII(n) in (15), which is the product of non-own goal
probability 1 − ρ(n) multiplied by non-outage probability at
the monitor e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (n)−1).
For any fixed n, as jamming power budget Qmax increases,
the first part, non-own goal probability, 1 − ρ(n) increases,
since the jammed channels become less likely to be chosen
by the suspicious link. The second part, non-outage probability
at the monitor, e−
λbσ
2
b
P (2
RII (n)−1) also increases, since the
suspicious link will transmit at a lower rate to maintain target
outage probability and the monitor can eavesdrop more clearly.
Thus ϕII(n) monotonically increases with Qmax for any fixed
n.
For ϕIIAB(n), we can see from (20) that
lim
Qmax→0+
ϕIIAB(1) > lim
Qmax→0+
ϕIIAB(2),
and from (21), we can see that
lim
Qmax→∞
ϕIIAB(1) < lim
Qmax→∞
ϕIIAB(2).
Thus there exists a unique solution Qmax, so that
ϕIIAB(1) = ϕ
II
AB(2),
and we call this solution as Q
AB
.
By assuming ϕIIAB(n) is unimodal or monotonic in n, if
Qmax < QAB , from ϕ
II
AB(1) > ϕ
II
AB(2) we can conclude that
ϕIIAB(n) now monotonically decreases with n. For ϕ
II
BA(n),
we can derive Q
BA
so that when Qmax < QBA, ϕ
II
BA(n)
decreases with n. Define Q = min{Q
AB
, Q
BA
}, when
Qmax < Q, both ϕIIAB(n) and ϕ
II
BA(n) decrease with n, thus
it is optimal for the monitor to jam n∗ = 1 channel.
Similarly for ϕIIAB(n), we can see from (20) that
lim
Qmax→0+
ϕIIAB(N − 2) > lim
Qmax→0+
ϕIIAB(N − 1),
and from (21), we can see that
lim
Qmax→∞
ϕIIAB(N − 2) < lim
Qmax→∞
ϕIIAB(N − 1).
There exists a unique solution Qmax, so that
ϕIIAB(N − 2) = ϕIIAB(N − 1),
and we call this solution as Q¯AB .
By assuming ϕIIAB(n) is unimodal or monotonic in n,
if Qmax > Q¯AB , from ϕIIAB(N − 2) < ϕIIAB(N − 1)
we can conclude that ϕIIAB(n) now monotonically increases
with n. Similarly for ϕIIBA(n), we can derive Q¯BA so that
when Qmax > Q¯BA, ϕIIBA(n) increases with n. Define
Q¯ = max{Q¯AB , Q¯BA}, when Qmax < Q¯, both ϕIIAB(n) and
ϕIIBA(n) increase with n, thus it is optimal for the monitor to
jam n∗ = N − 1 channels.
When Q ≤ Qmax ≤ Q¯, at least one of ϕIIAB(n) and ϕIIBA(n)
is unimodal. Without loss of generality, we assume n∗AB ≤
n∗BA, clearly when n < n
∗
AB , both ϕ
II
AB(n) and ϕ
II
BA(n) are
monotonically increasing, and when n > n∗BA, both ϕ
II
AB(n)
and ϕIIBA(n) are monotonically decreasing. Thus n
∗ must lie
between n∗AB and n
∗
BA, and can be numerically searched.
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